Matt Blaze's Technical Papers
Last updated 6 August 2006
Many of my technical papers are available here. Newer papers are usually in Adobe PDF format; like it or not, PDF is the de facto standard format for scientific papers these days. Most of the older papers are in PostScript format; you'll need a PostScript printer or viewer (such as GhostView) to read them. Most of these files have also been converted to Adobe PDF format (using ps2pdf) and can be viewed or printed with a PDF viewer such as Acrobat, acroread4, or xpdf. If you have a choice, you'll probably find the PostScript version looks and works better than the PDF version does (ps2pdf doesn't do particularly well with some of the fonts). A few papers are available as plain ASCII text or LaTeX source.
Wiretapping, Surveillance and Countermeasures
The Trustworthy Network Eavesdropping and Countermeasures (TNEC) project studies the reliability of communications interception systems and technologies. A better understanding of the limitations of eavesdropping techniques could lead to more trustworthy law enforcement wiretap evidence (or at least more appropriate treatment of electronic evidence), networks with properties that inherently frustrate (or facilitate) interception, and new techniques for achieving communications security.
One of our first efforts is a comprehensive analysis of the wiretapping technologies used by law enforcement (for both voice and data). We have found serious exploitable weaknesses in fielded interception systems. For details, including audio demos of novel eavesdropping countermeasures, see the wiretapping web page here.
Similar vulnerabilities exist in digital Internet eavedropping systems as well:
Another focus of the TNEC project examines local host-based surveillance. The JitterBug demonstrates a novel eavesdropping threat against typed keyboard input. Commercially-available hardware keyboard "sniffers" can easily capture and store an unsuspecting user's keystrokes. Because a subverted keyboard has no direct network connection, sniffer attacks are generally assumed to require either support software on the host or periodic in-person access by the attacker to retrieve the data. We show that this need not be the case. A new technique based on "JitterBugs" can exflitrate captured data entirely through subtle perturbations in the precise times at which typed keystrokes are passed to the host. Whenever a user runs an interactive network application (such as SSH), an attacker can derive previously captured keystrokes entirely by observing the timing of network packets, even from across the Internet or via encrypted wireless traffic. The JitterBug demonstrates that input devices must be scrutinized as part of any trusted computing base and, more generally, that simple "supply chain attacks" can represent a practical and serious threat to data confidentiality. (Gaurav Shah and Andres Molina won the Best Student Paper award at USENIX Security 2006 for this work.)
Physical and "Human-Scale" Security
Cryptologic techniques can be applied outside of computers and networks, Perhaps surprisingly, the abstractions used in analyzing secure computing and communications systems turn out also to be useful for understanding mechnical locks and their keyspaces. Indeed, modeling master keyed locks as online authentication oracles leads directly to efficient solutions for what might naively seem like exponential problems for the attacker. In fact, it seems like almost a textbook example, as if master keying practices for locks were designed specifically to illustrate this class of weakness. We sometimes assume that hardware-based security is inherently superior to that based in software, but even the humble mechanical lock can be just as insecure as complex computing systems, and can fail in similar ways.
A widely circulated paper of mine describes attacks against master keyed mechanical locks. For an overview of the attack, which was described in the January 23rd 2003 New York Times, click here. For a brief commentary on the reaction to this paper, see my essay, "Keep it secret, stupid!" (click here), which was originally posted to comp.risks.
(Warning: there are embedded photos in this paper; they make the PS and PDF files very large. The GZIPed PostScript version is 5.7MB long (uncompresses to 14MB), and the PDF version is 4MB long.)
While the security metrics and mechanical safeguards used in safes and vaults may not rely on the latest technology, they are often quite ingenious. They may have much to teach computer security. Some of what I understand about the subject is in the survey paper below (warning -- heavily illustrated 2.5MB .pdf file). And for a brief commentary on the reaction to this paper, see my essay, "the second sincerest form of flattery" (click here), which was originally posted to interesting-people.
This position paper, presented at the Cambridge Security Protocols Workshop 2004, introduces and advocates the "Human Scale Security Project," which supports the above work.
These papers introduce the "trust management" approach to specifying and enforcing security policy.
Angelos Keromytis's KeyNote Trust Management toolkit and open-source reference implementation is available here as a GZIPed TAR archive. The toolkit runs under most Unix-like (BSD, linux, etc.) platforms, with limited support for Win32 platforms.
Also see Angelos Keromytis' KeyNote web page for the latest details on the KeyNote implementation.
These papers introduce and formalize the notion of "remotely-keyed" encryption, in which a low-bandwidth, but trusted device (such as a smart card) assists a high-bandwidth, but untrusted host with bulk encryption.
These papers describe and evaluate various key escrow proposals, from a technical (as opposed to political) perspective.
These papers describe the design and implementation network-layer and related security protocols, including JFK, a secure key exchange protocol, and swIPe, a predecessor to the IPSEC standard. (At this point, swIPe is of primarily historical interest, although the USENIX paper should be of some value to IPSEC implementors. JFK is a useful key exchange protocol that should be especially valuable for IPSEC and network security key management).
Ciphers and Algorithms
Cryptography Policy, Export Regulations, and Politics
My dissertation work, over ten years ago, anticipated and analyzed what we would now call "Peer-to-Peer" file distribution.
Other People's Papers
From time to time, I make available papers from other researchers that I didn't write myself but that are of wide interest and don't otherwise have a home. Here's what's available now:
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