Update 19 January 2005: See also my essay, "the second sincerest form of flattery," for the reaction to a recent paper I wrote about what we can learn from mechanical safe locks.
Keep it secret, stupid!
26 January 2003
Last year, I started wondering whether cryptologic approaches might be useful for the analysis of things that don't use computers. Mechanical locks seemed like a natural place to start, since they provided many of the metaphors we used to think about computer security in the first place.
So I read everything I could get my hands on about locks, which included most of the available open literature and at least some of the "closed" literature of that field. Once I understood the basics, I quickly discovered, or more accurately re-discovered, a simple and practical rights amplification (or privilege escalation) attack to which most master-keyed locks are vulnerable. The attack uses access to a single lock and key to get the master key to the entire system, and is very easy to perform. For details, see http://www.mattblaze.org/masterkey.html.
I wrote up the attack, in a paper aimed more at convincing computer scientists that locks are worth our attention than anything else (I called it "Rights amplification in master-keyed mechanical locks"). As I pointed out in the paper, surely I could not have been the first to discover this -- locksmiths, criminals, and college students must have figured this out long ago. Indeed, several colleagues mentioned that my paper reminded them of their college days. There is considerable evidence that similar methods for master key decoding have been discovered and rediscovered over the years, used illicitly and passed along as folklore (several people have unearthed Internet postings dating back as much as 15 years describing how to make master keys). Curious college students -- and professional burglars -- have long been able to get their hands on master keys to the places that interest them.
But the method does not seem to appear in the literature of locks and security, and certainly users of master keyed locks did not seem to know about this risk. I submitted the paper to a journal and circulated it to colleagues in the security community. Eventually, the paper reached the attention of a reporter at the New York Times, who wrote it up in a story on the front page of the business section last week.
The response that followed surprised me. For a few days, my e-mail inbox was full of angry letters from locksmiths, the majority of which made both the point that I'm a moron, because everyone knew about this already, as well as the point that I'm irresponsible, because this method is much too dangerous to publish. A few managed to also work in a third point, which is that the method couldn't possibly work because obviously I'm just some egghead who doesn't know anything about locks.
Those letters, with their self-canceling inconsistency, are easy enough to brush aside, but there seems to be a more serious problem here, one that has led to a significant real-world vulnerability for lock users but that is sadly all too familiar to contemporary observers of computer security.
The existence of this method, and the reaction of the locksmithing profession to it, strikes me as a classic instance of the failure of the "keep vulnerabilities secret" security model. I'm told that the industry has known about this vulnerability and chosen to do nothing -- not even warn its customers -- for over half a century. Instead it was kept secret and passed along as folklore, sometimes used as a shortcut for recovering lost master keys for paying customers. If at some point in the last fifty years this method had been documented properly, surely the threat could have been addressed and lock customers allowed to make informed decisions about their own security.
The tragic part is that there are alternatives. There are several lock designs that turn out to resist this threat, including master rings and bicentric locks. While these designs aren't perfect, they resist completely the adaptive oracle attack described in my paper. It's a pity that stronger alternative designs have been allowed to die a quiet death in the marketplace while customers, ignorant of the risks, have spent over fifty years investing in inferior systems.
Although a few people have confused my reporting of the vulnerability with causing the vulnerability itself, I can take comfort in a story that Richard Feynman famously told about his days on the Manhattan project. Some simple vulnerabilities (and user interface problems) made it easy to open most of the safes in use at Los Alamos. He eventually demonstrated the problem to the Army officials in charge. Horrified, they promised to do something about it. The response? A memo ordering the staff to keep Feynman away from their safes.